Employers Should Remember The New York Wage Theft Prevention Act's February 1st Deadline

As readers of this blog may recall, in 2011 New York implemented the New York Wage Theft Prevent Act (the “Act”), which amended the New York Labor Law to impose new recordkeeping and notice obligations on the majority of employers operating within New York State, as well as expanding the civil and criminal remedies available when employers fail to comply with these provisions.  Specifically, the Act requires that by February 1st of each year, employers provide notice to employees of their rate(s) of pay, designated pay day, the employer's intent to claim allowances as part of minimum wage, all identifying, affiliate and contact information for the employer, which includes the name of the employer and any "doing business as" names used by the employer and additional information that may be specified by the Commissioner of Labor.  

The notice must be provided in the employee's primary language, as identified by the employee, through translated notices provided by the Department of Labor.  These notices are required at the time of hire, as well as yearly between January 1 and February 1, and when there are changes in the information on the pay notices.  With respect to changes in the terms of an employee’s notice, the employer must provide notice of changes to the affected employees either in a separate written notice seven days in advance of the change or in the detailed wage statement accompanying payment of wages.  The employer is required to retain copies of these notices and a signed, dated acknowledgement of receipt from each employee for six years.  The notices must be made available to the Department of Labor upon request.

Employers should also be aware of changes in the Act that expand the Department of Labor's authority to enforce the Labor Law.  For example, the Act increases the mandatory liquidated damages for wage violations to 100% of unpaid wages.  In addition, the Act provides for interest from the date of any underpayment and additional civil penalties for failure to comply with final judgments within 90 days.  The Act also provides for individual recovery of civil damages for each workweek in which the employer fails to comply with its new notice requirements.  Finally, the Act expands an employee's ability to bring complaints and private actions for such violations, while also strengthening an employee's protections against any prohibited retaliation by an employer.  Prohibited retaliation includes, among other things, any action that negatively affects workers such as discharge, suspension, transfer to another shift or reduction in wages or hours, which is done because a worker has engaged in a protected activity.  A protected activity includes any of the following: an employee’s right to complain to their employer, the Department of Labor or the Attorney General about possible violations of the Labor Law and regulations issued under it; an employee’s right to file a complaint about these possible violations and give information about their conditions of employment to the Department of Labor or Attorney General; and an employee’s right to testify at hearings or other proceedings.  The penalties for retaliation can include fines up to $10,000, as well as an additional $10,000 in liquidated damages.  The Department of Labor can also request reinstatement of the worker and/or compensation for lost wages.

With February 1, 2012, the deadline for compliance quickly approaching, New York employers should take steps to ensure compliance with these necessary obligations.

United States Supreme Court Recognizes "Ministerial Exception" and Bars Certain Religious Employees from Bringing Employment Discrimination Claims

In a significant religious freedom decision, on January 11, 2012, the United States Supreme Court unanimously recognized a “ministerial exception” to employment discrimination laws.  The “ministerial exception” had been recognized by the lower Courts of Appeals, but, until now, had not been affirmed by the Supreme Court.  In its decision, the Court found that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment preclude “ministers” from asserting employment discrimination claims against their churches. 

In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission – No. 10-553, the Court addressed the claims of Cheryl Perich (“Perich”), a teacher at the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School (the “Church”), which is a member of the Lutheran Church – Missouri Synod in Redford, Michigan.  Perich claimed that the Church terminated her because of her disability, narcolepsy, as well as her threat to pursue a disability discrimination claim.  The Church claimed that it terminated Perich because she violated its religious doctrine by failing to resolve her conflict internally rather than initiate litigation.

Following Perich’s termination, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission sued the Church on behalf of Perich alleging that her termination was unlawful and in retaliation of her threats to file an Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) lawsuit.  The lower courts acknowledged the “ministerial exception” to anti-discrimination laws, and thus, recognized the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of religion to churches and their operations with regard to their treatment of employees.  The Supreme Court upheld the exception.  Issuing the Court’s opinion, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote that “the interest of society and the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important … but so, too, is the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith and carry out their mission.”  The Court expressed concern that requiring churches to follow anti-discrimination laws could hinder their selection and retention of religious leaders. 

In precluding Perich from pursuing her employment discrimination claim, the Court considered whether Perich was a religious employee, or “minister,” covered by the ministerial exception.  Although she taught secular subjects, a small portion of her day involved religious duties.  Moreover, the Court recognized that Perich was a “called” (to God) teacher who had received religious training.  Thus, the Court found her to be covered by the ministerial exception and prohibited from invoking anti-discrimination laws.  Although concluding that Perich was a “minister,” the Court neglected to establish a bright line rule distinguishing religious from secular employees, leaving such determinations to the facts of each case.